

## Community resources

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## Viewing cable 09DHAHRAN145, ARAMCO SKEPTICAL OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09DHAHRAN145**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">09DHAHRAN145</a>	<a href="#">2009-06-17 13:43</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">SECRET//NOFORN</a>	<a href="#">Consulate Dhahran</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/06/13/115715/wikileaks-cables-show-worry-about.html>

VZCZCXRO1281  
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR  
DE RUEHDH #0145 1681343  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
P 171343Z JUN 09  
FM AMCONSUL DHAHRAN  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0174  
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE  
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0222  
  
S E C R E T DHAHRAN 000145  
  
NOFORN  
SIPDIS  
  
PLEASE PASS TO NEA/ARP JOSHUA HARRIS  
  
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/17/2019  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [EPET](#) [ENRG](#) [SA](#)  
SUBJECT: ARAMCO SKEPTICAL OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION  
INITIATIVE  
  
REF: DE RHEBAAA #2397 1281145  
  
CLASSIFIED BY: Joseph Kenny, Consul General, EXEC, DOS.  
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

## 1. KEY POINTS:

- (S/NF) Saudi Aramco's Executive Management is skeptical of the presence of Ministry of Interior (MOI) critical infrastructure protection (CIP) forces near their oil and gas facilities.
- (S/NF) Aramco is currently undergoing a major upgrade to their perimeter surveillance system, in what may be an attempt to mitigate MOI encroachment on Aramco facilities.
- (S/NF) Several key Aramco contacts confirm that the recent resignation of the head of Aramco security was unrelated to the CIP initiative.

## 2. COMMENT:

- (S/NF) Saudi Aramco harbors deep reservations about MOI's growing involvement in the protection of its facilities, which Aramco deems unnecessary and ill-suited. Saudi Aramco is losing ground in this domestic wrangling over CIP, but is directing its rancor at the MOI, not the USG.

### ARAMCO SKEPTICAL OF MOI-CIP INITIATIVE

3. (S/NF) Aramco's Executive Management team including the CEO, Khalid al-Falih, is hesitant to permit MOI-CIP forces into their oil and gas facilities. This fact was made abundantly clear in a meeting that former Ambassador Fraker, the Consul General and PolOff had with al-Falih several months ago. Aside from the visibly uncomfortable gestures and eye contact he made with his Senior VP for Industrial Relations when CIP was raised, al-Falih noted that Aramco was very skeptical of the net benefit of having Saudi soldiers around highly combustible and very sensitive industrial facilities. He noted that after the terrorist attack on Abqaiq in 2005, Saudi soldiers deployed to protect the infrastructure were smoking cigarettes, driving their vehicles perilously close to equipment, and interfering in the operation of the oil facilities.

4. (S/NF) Al-Falih emphasized that Saudi Aramco is not happy about MOI (irrespective of USG involvement) interfering with their facilities and they believe that they are more than capable of protecting their own assets without outside help. It appears that Aramco has accepted the fact that MOI will inevitably be encroaching on their turf and are now in the process of mitigating this effect as much as possible. As testament to this observation, they are in the final stages of signing a contract for a \$1 billion perimeter surveillance system for all of their facilities across the kingdom. Northrop Grumman has been awarded the contract (close hold), though Aramco has not yet officially made the announcement. In addition, according to our sources in Aramco Affairs, the new Executive Director of Safety and Industrial Security, Mohammed al-Zahrani, was selected because of his knowledge of operations and facilities, not his security credentials. His most recent position was manager of the critical office of Oil Supply, Planning and Scheduling (OSPAS).

5. (S/NF) According to a cable from the Department of Energy (ref A), Samir Raslan, General Manager for Industrial Security at Aramco, was forced to resign by Aramco management. However, a number of post contacts at Aramco insist that Samir quit and was not fired or forced to resign. In fact, before submitting his resignation Raslan made it clear to his subordinates and to post that if he did not receive a promotion to Executive Director of Safety and Industrial Security he would move on from Aramco. When the position was given to al-Zahrani, he submitted his resignation.

KENNY